Introduction
Colombia has endured an internal armed conflict during several decades 1 . Yet, since 1999 the country experienced an escalation of the conflict that has been accompanied by a severe slowdown of economic activity. The following tables illustrate this fact. 1 The main actors of the conflict are, on one side, the FARC-EP (Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia-People's Army) and the ELN (National Liberation Army), the two major leftist guerrilla groups; and, on the other side, the legitimate armed forces and the majority of civil society. There are also right-winged, paramilitary, self-defense groups. Even though several factors contributing to the post-1999 economic contraction have been identified (capital outflow shock, banking crisis, fiscal imbalances, etc.), the deterioration of the domestic conflict has been at the core of the debate. It has been argued by policymakers that a permanent increase in military expenditure is a necessary condition for the recovery of economic growth. In fact, the government aims to increase military expenditure permanently in at least 1% of GDP. An interesting question arises: even if additional military expenditure stimulates economic activity, will the benefit (in terms of additional output) outweigh its cost (in terms of spent resources)? This paper tries to answer the latter question by suggesting a real business cycle (RBC) model that incorporates military expenditure and the costs of an internal conflict or war. The model captures the natural trade-off in military expenditure: crowding-out of private consumption and investment but less destruction (and, therefore, higher marginal productivity) of private capital and labor. Hence, in the model military expenditure below (above) a certain threshold generates a positive (negative) net benefit in terms of output. Once calibrated to Colombian data, the model reveals that an increase in military expenditure of 1% GDP is expansionary in terms of output, investment and consumption. The proposed methodology has never been used in Colombia to study the economic consequences of the internal armed conflict. Indeed, most of the Colombian literature employs econometric techniques to analyze this problem.
Different papers in the literature have studied the link between military expenditure and economic activity. Knight et. al. (1996) make an extension of the standard growth model and conclude that military spending has a growth-retarding effect due to a negative impact on capital formation and resource allocation. Stroup and Heckelman (2001) find that the effect of military expenditure over economic growth in Africa and Latin America is non-monotonic. Indeed, in their model military spending has a positive but diminishing influence over growth if the size of the defense sector is small relative to that of the rest of the economy; this influence turns negative as this sector grows.
Athanassiou et. al. (1998) analyze empirically the impact of defense expenditure over the Greek economy using two different methodologies: an econometric model and a computable general equilibrium model. The results under both methodologies suggest that the defense sector in Greece has had no positive impact over growth. The same result is found by Nikolaidou (1998) . Heo (1999) estimates a three-equation econometric model with Korean data and concludes that there are indirect negative effects of military spending over economic growth via exports and investment. A similar model is estimated for Taiwan by Huang (1999) . This author finds a positive impact of defense spending over the non-export private sector and a negative one over the more dynamic tradable sector. He also finds that the latter effect offsets the former one.
There are other studies that indirectly address the link between military spending and economic activity by highlighting the economic costs of armed conflicts. For example, Collier (1995) analyzes the economic effects of civil war and internal armed conflicts. He argues that civil war reduces income both in a direct and an indirect way. An armed conflict diminishes income directly through the diversion of resources into military activity, and indirectly through the reduction of the capital stock (physical, human and social). For instance, Imai and Weinstein (2000) show that widespread civil wars are five times more costly than narrowly fought internal conflicts and reduce economic growth by 1. Two caveats apply. First, the shock follows a stationary stochastic process due to the nature of this class of models. Thus, the shock does not capture literally a permanent increase in military spending. Still, the high persistence of the shock captures a long-lasting increase in military expenditure. Second, the model measures the net benefit of additional military spending in terms of output (or welfare) levels, not economic growth. The measurement of the net benefit in terms of higher output growth is a topic for a different paper.
The paper is divided in five sections. This introduction is the first one. In the second section the model is presented. Section three discusses the calibration of the model. In section four the results of the military expenditure shock experiment are presented. Section five concludes.
I. Model
Consider an economy inhabited by an infinite number of identical, infinitelylived, risk-averse households that discount the future at rate 1/ 1 β − . The mass of households is one. In every period each household is endowed with one unit of time to be allocated between labor and leisure. Labor is indivisible like in Hansen (1985) . The shift length is fixed at h<1 units of time and each household sends a fraction n of its members to work while the remaining fraction (1-n) does not work at all. Households have log utility in consumption (c) and leisure:
Each household owns capital (k) which is used to transfer purchasing power across periods. The capital stock depreciates at rate δ. The final good of this economy, which is the numeraire, is produced with a Cobb-Douglas technology in capital and labor, subject to random productivity shocks [exp(z)]. Indeed, stochastic variable z is governed by a stationary AR (1) process. Final goods can be consumed or accumulated as additional capital by households. Additionally, there is a central government that eats up some of the economy's output in every period.
The central assumption of the model is that, in every period, a fraction of the capital stock is lost or destroyed. This is a natural way to capture the economic impact of a domestic, armed conflict or rebellion. Furthermore, it is assumed that is a decreasing function of military expenditure. The idea behind this assumption is that the higher the capacity of the government to finance the defense sector, the higher the chances of dominating or neutralizing rebellion and, thereby, avoiding the associated economic costs [see Collier and Hoeffler (1998) ].
Note then that government expenditure (g) can be of two types: military [exp(m)] and non-military [exp(s)]. Both m and s are driven by stationary AR(1) stochastic processes. It is assumed that non-military expenditure simply generates a pure negative income effect on the economy (i.e. the resources are thrown away into the ocean). Military expenditure, on the other hand, does not generate a pure negative income effect: even though it reduces the volume of output available for private expenditure (consumption or investment), it also lowers the fraction of the capital stock that is destroyed in every period. Hence, the model captures a simple trade-off in military expenditure: crowding out of private consumption and investment, but less destruction (and, therefore, higher marginal productivity) 
It can be deducted easily that, in every period t, the state is given by (k t , z t , m t , s t ) while the control is given by (c t , n t , k t+1 ).
Mathematically, one can identify the trade-off in military expenditure by rewriting the resource constraint in the following way: Not surprisingly, the graph shows that additional military spending does not always bring about a positive net benefit on the economy. Indeed, the net benefit decreases monotonically with military expenditure so that there exists a threshold beyond which additional military spending imposes a net cost on the economy. Such threshold is given by the intersection of the curve and the x-axis. Now, the corresponding dynamic programming problem of the central planner is:
From the first order and envelope conditions the following optimality conditions are obtained: 
(2) is the Euler Equation governing the optimal consumption/capital accumulation path. As usual, it demands that the marginal cost and benefit of accumulating as capital an additional unit of output (instead of consuming it) be equated. The marginal cost is given by the forgone marginal utility of consumption today [lhs of (2)]. The marginal benefit is given by the expected discounted value of the marginal utility obtained from next period's marginal productivity of the additional unit of capital together with its non-depreciated fraction [rhs of (2)]. Interestingly, the rhs of (2) reveals that the internal conflict distorts the capital accumulation decision. In fact, the internal conflict (i.e. γ t+1 ) reduces the expected value of the marginal productivity of capital in the future. This reduces the marginal benefit of accumulating capital and, thereby, implies less incentives to invest.
Equation (3) captures the intratemporal labor-supply decision. It is a standard condition that equates the marginal benefit (in utils) of one additional unit of employment (lhs) to the marginal cost (also in utils) of supplying that additional unit of employment (rhs). The lhs of (3) shows that the internal conflict also distorts the labor-supply decision. Specifically, the internal conflict (i.e.γ t ) reduces the marginal productivity of employment. Hence, the internal conflict reduces the marginal benefit of supplying labor and, thereby, implies less incentives to operate productively in the market.
In sum, the model captures the economic costs of the conflict with the intertemporal and intratemporal distortions embedded in the optimality conditions (2) and (3). By reducing the incentives to invest and to work, both distortions imply a smaller volume of output (and welfare) in the stationary state of the economy, relative to a peaceful world.
II. Calibration
Parameters were calibrated to an annual frequency using Colombian data for the period 1952-1997 (see calibration appendix In the estimation of the processes of m and s time dummies were introduced to reduce the variance of the estimated residuals. Otherwise, huge, extraordinary, investment expenditures in the military sector introduce a lot of noise into the series 6 µ 0 , µ 1 and µ 2 were not estimated; they were fixed for calibration purposes (see calibration appendix). 
III. Experiment
To estimate the impact of a military expenditure shock over the economy an impulse-response exercise was carried out using the calibrated model. The experiment consisted of a one standard deviation shock to the noise term in the stochastic process driving military expenditure. The shock is equivalent to an increase of 0.32% of GDP in military expenditure. The experiment's results were extrapolated linearly to quantify the impact of a military expenditure shock of 1% of GDP 7, 8 . The cumulated impact over output, consumption and investment per capita over the next ten years is reported in the following table: Recall that the Colombian government's policy is to increase military expenditure permanently in 1% of GDP. This expenditure hike was initially financed with a once-and-for-all 1.2% wealth tax on households, and firms with net worth above COP $169.5 million (between US$58,000 and US$59,000).
8
Even though the shock in the experiment does not capture literally a permanent increase in military spending (the process driving m is stationary), the high persistence of the shock captures a long-lasting increase in military expenditure (see Table 5 ).
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51 51 51 51 51 the former one (i.e. investment goes up). Due to the resource constraint and despite the increase in output (due to the positive productivity shock), the increase in military expenditure and investment must be accompanied by a fall in consumption.
But even though consumption falls on impact (to open up space for additional military expenditure and private investment), the cumulated output gains allow consumption to increase above its stationary trend three periods after the shock and to remain on positive grounds thereafter. Indeed, the cumulated net effect over all variables is positive. For instance, ten years after the shock, the cumulated net gain for output, investment and consumption per capita amounts to US$ 215, US$ 9 and US$ 10, respectively (see table 6 ).
Conclusions
This paper suggests a model to capture the natural trade-off in military expenditure: crowding-out of private spending, but less destruction (and, therefore, higher marginal productivity) of private capital and labor. The model is calibrated to Colombian data. An experiment with the model reveals that a long-lasting, 1% of GDP increase in military expenditure (current policy in such country) is expansionary in terms of output, investment and consumption levels.
Given the response of consumption (negative US$ 10 on impact but US$ 9 -cumulative -after 10 years), the net effect over welfare, measured as the (risk-aversion adjusted) present discounted value of the consumption flow, is not clear. However, in these type of models quantitative results must no be taken literally. They must be interpreted in relation to the response of other variables. Hence, this paper only proves that after a highly persistent, 1% of GDP, military expenditure shock to the Colombian economy, there is a positive cumulated effect over output (US$ 215) that is much higher than that over investment (US$ 10) and consumption (US$ 9). But, again, this does not necessarily mean that the welfare effect is negligible or negative. The dynamics of the model allow for a considerable welfare-enhancing effect.
Finally, it is important to note that the model does not capture the distortionary effects of the taxes that must be levied to finance military expenditure. 
Calibration appendix
Parameter values were chosen so that the model, in stationary state, mimics some long-run empirical regularities observed in Colombia. Specifically, the parameters were calibrated to an annual frequency using Colombian data for the period 1952-1997. Data was taken from DNP (1998), Sánchez (1994) , GRECO (1999) , Ministerio de Hacienda, Contraloría General de la República (CGR) and DANE. Military expenditure data comes from DNP (1998) and CGR.
The calibration process requires that the objects of the model have an appropriate empirical counterpart. As is standard in the RBC literature [see Cooley and Prescott (1995) ], in this class of models the stock of capital must have as empirical counterpart not only private capital, but also public capital and the stock of consumer durables. Additionally, net exports must be treated as investment given that the model portrays a closed economy. Thus, measured investment should be adjusted to include public investment, consumption of durables and net exports so that the macro identity in the data is properly mapped into the model. Moreover, the proper empirical counterpart of the model's output (y) should be observed GDP adjusted to include income imputable to public capital and to the stock of consumer durables. However, due to the nature of this paper's model and to the nature and availability of Colombian data, the data treatment must deviate a little from the standard technique suggested by Cooley and Prescott (1995) .
In contrast to the U.S., total investment in Colombian national accounts includes not only private investment but also public investment. Consequently, the adjustment of observed GDP and observed investment to account for public investment should not be relevant in Colombian data (i.e. the adjustment is already in the observed data). Nonetheless, military expenditure in the model is an abstraction of both operational and investment expenditures in the defense and security sector. As a result, non-military expenditure in the model should also refer to both operational and investment expenditures in the non-military sectors of the government. Therefore, public investment was extracted from the total investment series in the national accounts and added to the public expenditure series. Of course, public capital and income imputable to public capital were also extracted from the observed total capital stock and GDP series, respectively Due to data limitations, durable consumption had to be treated as pure consumption. Hence, the stock of consumer durables could not be added to the capital stock, observed investment could not be augmented with durable consumption and observed GDP could not be adjusted to include income imputable to the stock of durables. It is also important to highlight that, according to the model, the stock of observed or measurable capital is given by (1-γ)k instead of k. Thus, for calibration purposes, the observed average capital-output ratio was divided by the mean of (1-γ) to obtain the correct empirical counterpart of the model's k/y. Finally, it should be noted that employment in the model (n) is to be interpreted as (number of occupied persons)/(economically active population).
The calibration process was divided in three steps.
Step 1: (b, µ µ µ µ µ 1 ) 
This is:
represents steady state output gross of capital destruction (i.e. steady state output without conflict). Note: To compute income imputable to public capital (k G ) the methodology of Cooley and Prescott (1995) was employed. Income imputable to public capital (y G ) is given by:
where r G is the rate of return of public capital and δ G is its rate of depreciation. To compute income imputable to public capital r G =10% and δ G = 7.3% were taken from Sánchez (1994). 
is the unconditional mean of m t . Thus:
Now, recall that the steady state value of military expenditure is given by exp(m) = exp(µ 1 ), while that of other public expenditure is given by . Therefore, the value of µ 1 was set arbitrarily at:
while the value of µ 2 was obtained residually in order to guarantee consistency with the calibrated resource constraint (see Step 3 below).
Note then that given:
equations (1A) and (2A) determine:
Step 2: (α α α α α, δ δ δ δ δ, β β β β β, h)
Note that:
Hence:
Now, consider the resource constraint in steady state:
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Given that: 
